Auditor choice, audit fees and internal governance in family firms by HE, Shaohua
Lingnan University 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 
Theses & Dissertations Department of Finance and Insurance 
2010 
Auditor choice, audit fees and internal governance in family firms 
Shaohua HE 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
He, S. (2010). Auditor choice, audit fees and internal governance in family firms (Master's thesis, Lingnan 
University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.14793/fin_etd.3 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Finance and Insurance at Digital 
Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. 
Terms of Use 
 
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its 
author. Any reproduction, adaptation, 
distribution or dissemination of this thesis 
without express authorization is strictly 
prohibited.  
 
All rights reserved. 
  
 
AUDITOR CHOICE, AUDIT FEES AND INTERNAL GOVERNANCE IN 
FAMILY FIRMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HE SHAOHUA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
MPHIL 
 
 
 
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 
 
2010 
  
 
AUDITOR CHOICE, AUDIT FEES AND INTERNAL GOVERNANCE IN 
FAMILY FIRMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
HE Shaohua 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy in Business   
(Finance & Insurance) 
 
 
 
Lingnan University 
 
 
 
2010
  
 
ABSTRACT 
Auditor choice, Audit Fees and Internal Governance in Family Firms 
 
 
by 
HE Shaohua 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
I study the role of auditing in mitigating agency concerns in family firms. Family 
firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and 
control (Type 1) but more severe agency problems between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders (Type 2). As family firms make up a large part of most free 
enterprise economies it is important to examine these two agency problems with 
respect to auditor choice and audit effort. I find that family firms are more likely to 
choose a specialist auditor than nonfamily firms, consistent with the argument that 
family firms need to signal their non-expropriating behaviors by choosing specialist 
auditors. I further find that audit fees are lower in family firms compared to non-
family firms, consistent with the hypothesis that the Type 1 agency conflict 
dominates the Type 2 agency conflict in the determination of audit effort and pricing. 
Moreover, consistent with prior literature that states that effective internal 
governance demands a quality auditor and more audit effort irrespective of 
ownership structure, I find that the positive association between family ownership 
and specialist auditor choice is stronger when internal governance is strong and the 
negative relation between audit fees and family ownership is weaker when the 
internal governance is strong. I find that these results on audit fees are robust to the 
use of alternative measures of concentrated influence such as CEO ownership, inside 
director ownership, and the presence of one or more founder directors. I also find 
that the effect of internal governance on audit fees is not limited to one or a few 
components of internal governance.  
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Auditor choice, Audit Fees and Internal Governance in Family Firms 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Auditing has long been identified as playing a governance role in mitigating the 
agency concerns in firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesize that auditing 
increases the value of the firm by reducing the incentive problems that arise when the 
manager does not own all the residual claims of the firm (Watts and Zimmerman 
1983). Using a semi-structured interview, Cohen et al. (2002) show that auditors 
consider corporate governance as an important determinant of the audit process and 
plan their audit to mitigate the adverse effects of poor governance. The governance 
role of the external audit is also recognized by regulators (See the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC 1999) pronouncement on audit committee disclosure). 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 established Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) as a new entity to oversee the audits of public companies with the 
explicit purpose of protecting the interests of their investors by producing 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. In the academic literature and 
regulatory pronouncements, auditing is recognized as an important element in 
reducing the information asymmetry between managers and investors. The auditing 
and accounting standards that form the basis of an audit are both designed to provide 
credible information to investors.  
However, the corporate governance role of auditors in reducing the agency 
conflict between different classes of investors is less clear. Auditing standards 
address the issue of inter-investor information asymmetry only indirectly. For 
example, SAS 45 requires auditors to “place primary emphasis” on the adequacy of 
disclosure with regard to related party transactions. SAS 57 requires auditors to 
evaluate the reasonableness of management estimates if they affect financial 
statements. PCAOB’s Auditing Standard 5 requires auditors to evaluate the firm’s 
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controls with regard to potential material misstatements due to fraud and the 
possibility of management override of existing controls. One could argue that the 
disclosure of related party transactions helps reduce the information asymmetry 
between controlling shareholders who might indulge in such transactions and non-
controlling shareholders who might be hurt by them. Paying particular attention to 
managerial override of controls also reduces insiders’ ability to indulge in 
expropriating behavior. However, these standards do not change the primary 
mandate of auditors, which is to reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors.  
Although there is no direct mandate on auditors to address the inter-investor 
agency conflict, there is prior evidence that auditors help in mitigating these concerns. 
In the context of initial public offerings, many studies have shown that auditors 
reduce the informational differences between informed inside investors and the 
external investors to whom the stock is offered (Michaely and Shaw 1995; Beatty 
1989; Menon and Williams 1991; Weber and Willenborg 2003). Auditors have been 
shown to help mitigate the agency concerns of foreign investors in privatized firms 
(Guedhami and Pittman 2006; Guedhami et al. 2009).  In their study of East Asian 
economies, Fan and Wong (2005) show that the auditor can limit the ability of 
insider investors to manipulate accounting reports and hide any expropriation from 
external investors. Further, auditors can discourage self-dealing activities by insiders 
by pressing for improved disclosures of related party transactions.  
The abovementioned studies suggest that auditors have the capability to 
improve corporate governance by reducing the agency concerns between informed 
and uninformed investors. But do they have the incentive to expend effort and other 
resources in the face of a highly competitive audit market? In the absence of explicit 
auditing standard requirements, auditors need other specific contextual incentives to 
devote effort and resources to reducing agency concerns between informed and 
uninformed investors. In the initial public offering context, inside investors need to 
attract capital from the external investors and are therefore motivated to reduce 
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informational differences between them and external investors. They are therefore 
likely to demand that the auditors decrease the information asymmetry between the 
inside investors who currently hold the shares and the outside investors who need to 
be attracted to buy the shares during and after the offering. This demand provides the 
requisite specific motivation for auditors to play a corporate governance role. 
In the context of concentrated family ownership, the controlling owners might 
voluntarily choose auditing as a bonding mechanism (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
The family owners would then provide the requisite motivation for the auditors to 
mitigate the agency concerns of non-family shareholders. On the other hand, if the 
private control benefits of family investors are higher than the benefits they obtain 
from bonding, they will not direct the auditors to reduce the information asymmetry 
between them and non-family investors. Family investors are influential in 
appointing the auditor, maintaining the contract and deciding their fees. In a 
competitive audit market, where there is no general mandate for auditors to reduce 
the agency concerns of minority investors, auditors are unlikely to voluntarily devote 
their effort and resources to do so against the wishes of family investors. In effect, 
even though the auditors might have the ability to mitigate the agency problem 
between controlling and non-controlling investors, the question remains as to 
whether they have sufficient incentive to do so. We argue that if a family firm 
appoints a strong, independent and effective board of directors, the bonding effect is 
more likely to prevail. On the other hand, if the board is not as strong, the private 
benefits effect is more likely to prevail. 
In this thesis, I address the role of auditors in mitigating the two 
abovementioned agency conflicts by examining the effect of family ownership on 
auditor choice and audit effort. I find a positive association between family 
ownership and specialist auditor choice, and a negative association between family 
ownership and audit effort at the aggregate level.  I then examine whether these 
relationships are different under different levels of board effectiveness in the second 
stage. I find that a positive association between family ownership and specialist 
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auditor choice is stronger when the board is more effective and that the negative 
association between family ownership and audit effort is weaker when the board is 
more effective.  
My use of family firms for addressing this issue is motivated by two reasons. 
First, although ownership is more dispersed in the U.S. than in many other countries, 
nearly a third of the firms in S&P 500 index are characterized by founding family 
involvement (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Wang 2006), which allows me to examine 
the issue in a large sample of firms.  Second,  family controlled firms face less severe 
agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and management 
(referred to as the Type 1 agency problem) but are characterized by more severe 
agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (referred to 
as the Type 2 agency problem)1. Investors face a less severe Type 1 agency problem 
because the controlling family is better informed about the operations of the firm and 
is therefore better able to directly monitor the value-relevance of managerial actions 
and decisions (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). This enables family firms to depend less on 
accounting reports to evaluate the performance of managers and, correspondingly, 
the managers feel less able to mislead the dominant investors by hiding the results of 
poor performance by opportunistically choosing accounting methods and estimates. 
Logically then, the auditors could save on verification procedures and costs, a fact 
that is likely to be reflected in lower audit fees in a competitive audit market2. On the 
other hand, the significant extent to which the family owns stock and controls board 
directors results in higher Type 2 agency problems (Anderson and Reeb 2003, 2004). 
Type 2 agency problems include the expropriation and enjoyment of private control 
benefits (such as related party transactions) by the family members, which might 
induce them to mislead non-family investors through accounting reports (Leuz et al. 
2003).  This possibility should result in a greater demand for audit effort by those 
                                                            
1  The reduction of the Type 1 agency problem is often referred to as the “alignment effect” and the 
exacerbation of the Type 2 agency problem is referred to as the “entrenchment effect”(Wang 2006). 
 
2 After the AICPA changed its code of ethics in 1979 and allowed free advertising by auditors, 
auditors faced increased competition at all levels (Sunder 2003). 
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family firms that want to allay fears of Type 2 agency problems. In effect, in the case 
of family controlled firms, two forces are at work on the audit fee: a decrease 
brought about by the lower level of Type 1 agency problem and an increase brought 
about by the higher level of Type 2 agency problem.  
The effect of the trade-off between the two agency problems on auditor effort 
hinges on the incentives that the controlling family shareholders have for bonding 
behavior. If the controlling owners find that the gains from hiding private control 
benefits through less transparent reporting (Leuz et al. 2003) is lower than the gain 
from transparent reporting to minority shareholders, they are more likely to engage in 
bonding behavior. As part of their bonding behavior, they are more likely to have 
more effective internal governance3 in place (Linck et al. 2008; Boone et al. 2007; 
Raheja 2005).  In these firms, auditing will be used as a complementary mechanism 
to signal higher transparency and less expropriation by controlling shareholders. In 
order to support the bonding behavior, auditors will be expected by the family 
owners to improve transparency and mitigate the agency problem between them and 
the non-family shareholders. In this situation, even though less audit effort is needed 
to mitigate the Type 1 agency problem, it is compensated for by more audit effort 
that is needed to mitigate the Type 2 agency problem. Therefore, the audit effort 
demanded of the auditor is not necessarily reduced because of concentrated family 
ownership, resulting in a weaker relation between family ownership and audit fees. 
In contrast, in firms where the controlling insiders do not undertake board-based 
monitoring, auditors are less motivated to mitigate the Type 2 agency cost. In those 
firms, the negative relationship between family ownership and audit fee will be 
accentuated.  
My examination of the relationship between auditor choice (audit fees) and 
family ownership confirms the above relationships. In the aggregate analysis, I find a 
                                                            
3 We use the term “internal governance” to denote board-based, committee-based and other internal 
mechanisms to improve transparency. We differentiate this type of governance from the “external” 
market-based governance that arises from the market for corporate control, product competition, and 
other market forces. 
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positive association between family ownership and specialist auditor choice, 
consistent with the signaling incentive of family owners, and a negative relation 
between family ownership and audit fee, consistent with the argument that the 
reduction of the Type 1 agency problem outweighs the increase of the Type 2 agency 
problem. I surmise from these results that the mandated role of the auditor in 
mitigating the Type 1 agency problem between managers and investors drives audit 
effort more than the role of auditors in reducing the Type 2 agency problem between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. In the differential analysis, consistent 
with my expectation, I find that the positive association between family ownership 
and specialist auditor choice is stronger for firms with a stronger board, and that the 
negative relationship between audit fee and family ownership is weaker for firms that 
have stronger board-based monitoring. I measure overall board-based monitoring 
strength using indices based on Larcker and Richardson (2004) and Carcello et al. 
(2002). I repeat the analysis with several components of board-based monitoring 
effectiveness and obtain similar results. Based on these results, I surmise that in 
situations where family controlled firms take steps to signal their transparency by 
having boards with strong monitoring effectiveness and choosing specialist auditors, 
auditors indeed play a governance role in mitigating the Type 2 agency problem. 
My findings contribute to the current literature in several ways. It brings 
together the results of three strands of research: the role of auditors in mitigating the 
Type 1 agency problem between managers and investors; the moderating effect of 
ownership structure in auditors’ mitigation of the Type 1 agency problem (Gul et al. 
2003), and the governance role of auditors in mitigating the Type 2 agency problem 
(Fan and Wong 2005). My findings suggest that the auditors have the capability to 
mitigate the Type 2 agency problem but do not have a mandate to do so in a normal 
audit. However, given the proper incentives, auditors can mitigate the Type 2 agency 
problem. In this sense, my research complements the studies on an auditor’s role in 
initial public offerings or in privatized firms seeking foreign investors alluded to 
earlier. My results validate the hypothesis that in some family firms that undertake 
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bonding effort, auditors are motivated to mitigate the Type 2 agency problem. By 
integrating the results of these three strands of literature, my study helps us to 
understand the complex interactions between auditing, governance, and ownership 
structure.  
The next chapter provides a brief review of supporting literature and chapter 3 
develops the hypotheses. The fourth chapter describes the research methodology and 
data. Chapter 5 describes the empirical results and discussions thereon. The last 
chapter presents my conclusions.   
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Studies on Family ownership 
 
Current literature on family ownership focuses on (i) the firm performance 
effect, and (ii) the disclosure effect. If family ownership is not the result of a demand 
for governance, it could be considered exogenous and could result in a reduction of 
Type I agency conflicts, which in turn enhances firm performance (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Several studies document this improvement in performance 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Yermack 1996). On the other hand, the performance of 
family firms might be compromised because of tensions between family and business 
objectives (Lansberg 1983; Levinson 1971; Barnes and Hershon 1976) and the 
smaller pool of talent from which managers are selected (Burkart et al. 2003). The 
firm performance effect is studied by Villalonga and Amit (2006) who find that 
family ownership in Fortune-500 firms creates value when the founder serves as 
CEO of the family firm or as chairman with a hired CEO but not when heirs who 
succeed the founder serve as CEOs. Miller et al. (2007) find that the effect of family 
ownership on firm performance relies on the way in which family businesses are 
defined. Particularly in Fortune 1000 firms, including relatives as owners or 
managers shows they do not outperform in terms of market valuation whereas 
businesses with a lone founder outperform. To sum up, the effect of family 
ownership on performance seems to depend critically on whether the founder or 
successors are in charge. 
Theoretically, the mitigation of the Type 1 agency problem reduces the ability 
of managers to hide their performance by being less transparent. In turn, this could 
lead to higher quality of earnings and greater disclosure of investor-relevant 
information. On the other hand, if the family owners enjoy private control benefits, 
they have an incentive to be less transparent (Leuz et al. 2003). Therefore, the effect 
of family ownership on corporate disclosure cannot be unambiguously predicted.  Ali 
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et al. (2007) find that family firms report earnings that are more predictive of future 
cash flows and less distorted by opportunistic discretionary accruals compared to 
non-family firms. They also find that family firms are more likely to warn investors 
about bad news but are less likely to make voluntary disclosures about their 
corporate governance practices. Family firms also seem to attract more analysts and 
reduce analyst forecast dispersion and error. Their findings suggest that the effect of 
the reduced Type 1 agency problem dominates the potential increase in the Type 2 
agency problem with regard to disclosures. In a study that supports these findings, 
Wang (2006) also shows that the earnings of family-owned firms exhibit higher 
quality, lower abnormal accruals, greater informativeness and fewer transitory 
components compared to non-family firms. In contrast to the above two papers, 
Anderson et al. (2009) find that family firms are more opaque than non-family firms 
and attribute this opacity to extraction of private control benefits by family firms.  
 
2.2 Studies on management ownership 
 
A large number of studies have focused on the effect of management ownership 
on performance, disclosures, earnings quality, and auditing. Managerial or CEO 
ownership aligns managers’ interest with that of the shareholders and thereby has the 
direct effect of reducing the Type 1 agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976)4. In 
contrast to family ownership, managerial ownership has no direct link to the Type 2 
agency problem. In effect, a comparative study of CEO ownership and family 
ownership has the advantage of suggesting the incremental effect of Type 2 agency 
problem that applies only to family ownership. 
Using a sample of US firms, Warfield et al. (1995) show a higher information 
content of earnings and lower discretionary accruals in firms with high managerial 
                                                            
4  Management ownership can also lead to entrenchment when the market for corporate control is 
curtailed by the adoption of poison pills and other antitakeover devices (Almazan and Suarez 2003; 
Barnhart et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; Hu and Kumar 2004) or when managerial ownership 
exceeds a certain threshold (Yeo et al. 2002). 
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ownership. However, Cheng and Warfield (2005) indicate more earnings 
management in firms with high managerial stock ownership. In non-US markets, 
some studies (Gul et al. 2003; Gul et al. 2002; Jung and Kwon 2002) document the 
positive role of managerial/insider ownership on disclosure, while other studies (Oei 
et al. 2008; Gabrielsen et al. 2002; Yeo et al. 2002; García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta 2009) provide mixed evidence. 
 
2.3 Studies on auditor choice 
 
Prior studies have investigated the effect of ownership on auditor choice. Wang 
et al. (2008) find a negative relationship between state ownership and “Big auditor” 
choice in the China. Guedhami et al. (2009) report that privatized firms worldwide 
become less (more) likely to appoint a Big Four auditor as state (foreign) ownership 
increases. Fan and Wong (2005) document a positive relationship between the Big 
auditor choice and the wedge of vote-cash flow rights in East Asia companies, thus 
showing how Asian family firms signal their motivations to small investors. To sum 
up, given the expectation of small investors that controlling shareholders expropriate 
assets and resources away from the firms, controlling shareholders (state or family) 
need to signal their incentives by the Big auditor choice when the benefit of doing so 
outweighs the cost.  
Several studies examine the effect of internal governance on auditor choice.  
Hossain et al (2010) find firm-level internal governance is positively related to the 
firm’s Big N auditor choice in emerging markets. Lin and Liu (2009) report that 
strong internal governance has a positive effect on the Big N auditor choice in the 
China. In total, prior studies on non-US markets record a positive relationship 
between internal governance and the Big auditor choice. 
 
2.4 Studies on auditor response and pricing 
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Several studies have examined the role of auditors in mitigating the Type 1 
agency problem that results in information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. Of particular relevance to our study is Gul et al. (2003) who show that (i) 
auditors respond to discretionary accruals by increasing their effort and hence the 
fees charged the client; and (ii) that the relation between discretionary accruals and 
audit fees is weaker for firms with high management ownership. They interpret this 
result to mean that in firms with high managerial ownership, there is less Type 1 
agency problem and therefore there is less need for managers to opportunistically 
manage their earnings. Instead, the discretionary accruals estimated by managers are 
more likely to be value-relevant and therefore the auditors need to spend less 
verification and validation effort in auditing those accruals. Other studies (Teoh and 
Wong 1993; Gul 2006)  also support the positive role of the auditor in mitigating the 
Type 1 agency problem.  
Prior studies have also shown that auditors respond to the quality of disclosures 
by the firm. In fact, this is the assumption behind many studies on auditor 
independence (Frankel et al. 2002; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003) that use discretionary accruals as the indicator of audit quality. In other words, 
the assumption is that if the audit quality is good (the auditor is independent), the 
discretionary accruals will be lower. More directly, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) 
find that auditors plan more hours and increase billing rates in the face of earnings 
management risk. This is consistent with the current literature that links auditor effort 
to litigation risk (Simunic and Stein 1996; Pratt and Stice 1994; Simon and Francis 
1988) on the one hand, and earnings management to litigation risk on the other hand 
(Heninger 2001; Barron et al. 2001). Abbott et al. (2006) show that due to 
asymmetric litigation effects, audit fees are related more to the positive rather than to 
negative earnings management risk. Consistent with Simunic’s production view of 
auditing (Simunic 1980), these studies show that risk factors such as lax disclosure 
and earnings management by the client firm result in a higher “supply” of audit effort, 
resulting from the motivation of auditors to limit their litigation and reputation risks. 
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These studies support the view that in firms where the Type 1 agency cost is low as 
in the case of family firms and firms with high managerial ownership, auditors scale 
back their effort and this is reflected in lower audit fees.  
The interaction between corporate governance and auditing is more complex 
than the production view of auditing would have us believe. Hay et al.  (2006) argue 
that the pure production function view of auditing requires that the audit market be 
competitive and that the level of assurance delivered is constant for a given auditor 
across client firms. The first condition makes audit fees a function of the cost and the 
second condition gives a unique level of assurance at which the expected cost of 
auditor’s risk from not providing the marginal unit of assurance (due to litigation and 
reputation risks faced by the auditor) is equated to the production cost of providing 
the marginal unit of assurance. However, the second condition might not be satisfied 
because the boards in different firms might demand incrementally different levels of 
auditing (Carcello et al. 2002). Similarly, I argue that the context (e.g., bonding or 
private benefits) might determine the incremental audit effort required from the 
auditor. Knechel and Willekens  (2006) argue that these demand factors alter the 
audit effort provided by the auditor. In effect, the corporate governance effort 
required of the auditor is related more to the demand by the board rather than to the 
production function of the auditor, which is determined by auditing standards, 
litigation, and reputation risks.  
Prior studies have documented the effect of ownership on audit fees. Mitra et al. 
(2007) show that institutional and management ownership is negatively associated 
with audit fees. The negative association between managerial ownership and audit 
fees is also shown in the international context by Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004). 
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) show a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and audit fees. 
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Chapter 3. Hypotheses Development 
 
I use the evidence from prior studies and the aforesaid arguments to develop the 
hypotheses on the effect of family ownership and internal governance on auditor 
choice and audit fees.  
Fan and Wong (2005) indicate that firms are more likely to signal their non-
expropriating incentives by choosing a quality auditor when they face agency 
conflicts from the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights. Given that 
nonfamily investors expect family owners to expropriate and then discount the stock 
price, family firms are more likely to choose specialist auditors to signal to the 
nonfamily investors about their non-expropriation motivation compared to nonfamily 
firms that do not have so serious Type 2 agency problems as the family firms do.  I 
thus put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis H1a:  all else equal, family firms are more likely to choose specialist 
auditors than nonfamily firms. 
 
From Ali et al. (2007) discussed above, I expect that the effect of Type 1 agency 
problem dominates the Type 2 agency problem for family firms in the auditor’s 
pricing of their services.  Based on the arguments presented earlier, I formulate the 
following hypothesis on the aggregate relation between family ownership and audit 
fees. 
 
Hypothesis H1b:  all else equal, audit fee for family firms is lower than for non-family 
firms. 
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My discussion of the prior literature on the response of auditors to the presence 
of different levels of board effectiveness indicates that for family firms for which 
insiders’ private benefits are dominated by the need to signal transparency to 
minority shareholders, the positive relationship between specialist auditor choice and 
family ownership should be stronger and the negative relation between audit fee and 
family ownership should be weaker. On the other hand, for family firms for which 
the insiders’ private benefits dominate the need to signal transparency to minority 
shareholders, the positive relationship between specialist choice and family 
ownership should be weaker and the negative relation between audit fee and family 
ownership should be stronger. Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize the following 
differential relation between specialist auditor choice/audit fee and family ownership 
in the presence of differential board strengths. 
 
Hypothesis H2a:  all else equal, the positive relation between specialist auditor 
choice and family ownership is stronger in the presence of stronger boards 
compared to firms with weaker boards. 
 
Hypothesis H2b: all else equal, the negative relationship between audit fee and family 
ownership is weaker in the presence of stronger boards compared to firms with 
weaker boards.   
 
Furthermore, the strong board and good governance practices help reduce the 
reputation and litigation risks that specialist auditors face and therefore the specialist 
premiums are relatively lower than in other firms with weak internal governance. I 
thus put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis H2c: all else equal, the specialist auditor premium is smaller in the 
presence of stronger boards compared to firms with weaker boards. 
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Chapter 4.  Methodology and Data 
  
4.1 Research methodology 
 
My basic specialist auditor choice model is similar to the auditor choice model 
used by Fan and Wong (2005) that controls for the following well-documented 
factors: (i) the scale and scope of the audit measured by the client firm size; (ii) audit 
risk captured by two variables, the firm’s financial leverage and its return on assets. 
To test H1a, I employ the following model:            
 
SPECIALIST = β0 + β1LNMVE + β2LEVE + β3ROA + β4OWN  
+ Industry effects + Year effects +ε                                     (1) 
 
In the above model, OWN = Family or FamilyPlus is the experimental variable. 
Family is coded one if firm has family ties which go back a generation or two to the 
founder and play a key role in both ownership (≥20%) and board membership. 
FamilyPlus is coded one if Family is valued one or the firm has at least one founder 
who sits in the board as well as there being dual class stock that creates a wedge 
between cash flow rights and control rights in the firm. If the coefficient β4 is 
positive and significant in the corresponding regressions, it validates Hypothesis H1a. 
Some earlier studies, such as Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) and Ali et al. 
(2007), do not impose a minimum ownership criterion for identifying a firm as a 
family firm. Hutton (2007) gives examples from the Ali et al. (2007) sample where 
the family influence is quite low – like Percy Chubb who was a non-voting director 
on Chubb Co. directors. While Percy Chubb is a descendent of Chubb Co.’s founder, 
his share ownership in the firm is extremely low. It is debatable whether one could 
argue that the family has incentives to monitor the managers very carefully if they do 
not have significant ownership stakes. Other studies such as Ang et al. (1992), 
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Barontini and Capiro (2005), Barth et al. (2005), impose significant threshold 
restrictions either on ownership or voting rights or both. 
Prior literature has shown that founder presence on the board seems to reduce 
agency costs more than heir presence. What seems to matter is the incentive and 
interest that the family has in the firm. A high ownership stake signals such interest 
and incentive. Based on earlier literature on management ownership, auditor 
response (audit effort) can be expected in case of concentrated ownership. Therefore, 
I use the definition of family firm using a threshold restriction. 
My basic audit fee model, based on the theoretical constructs of Simunic (1980) 
is similar to the one used by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) that controls for the following 
well-documented factors: (i) client firm’s auditor choice measured by an indicator 
variable for the Big-4 auditors; (ii) the scale and scope of the audit measured by the 
client firm size; (iii) the complexity of the audit measured by the ratio of market to 
book value of equity using the reasoning that intangible growth options are included 
in the firm’s market value of equity but not in its book value; (iv) demand for 
additional audit work unrelated to ownership structure, measured by two variables – 
an indicator variable for merger or acquisition activity and a financing indicator 
variable that captures material capital infusion in the form of either debt or equity; 
and (v) audit risk captured by five variables - the firm’s financial leverage, the return 
on assets, the amount of inventory and accounts receivables relative to total assets, an 
indicator variable for loss-making firms, and an indicator variable if the firm reports 
special items. Firm performance variables such as ROA, market-to-book ratio, and 
the indicator variable for loss affect a myriad of risk factors such as litigation risk, 
reputation loss, and the potential for financial distress. Consistent with Simunic 
(1980) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003), I also include industry dummies as control 
variables. Additionally, I include year dummies to account for secular changes in 
audit fees over time.  
To test H1b, I include an indicator variable for family ownership and/or 
influence in addition to the controls mentioned above. The model is: 
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LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE  
+ β7ROA + β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε                                             (2) 
  
In the above model, OWN (= Family or FamilyPlus) is the experimental 
variable. In addition, we also examine the effect of CEO Holdings, Insider Holdings 
(the fraction of outstanding shares held by insider directors) and Founder (indicator 
variable if one or more of the directors are the founder(s) of the firm). The dependent 
variable, LNFEE is the log of audit fees. The full definitions of the dependent, 
control, and experimental variables are given in Table 1. If the coefficient β11 is 
negative and significant in the corresponding regressions, it validates Hypothesis 
H1b. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
To test hypothesis H2a and H2b, I need to measure the strength of the internal 
corporate governance that is independent of the ownership structure. Although there 
is extensive research on the role of internal corporate governance such as board 
effectiveness and CEO power, only recently have there been some attempts to 
aggregate these into indices in a manner similar to the shareholder rights governance 
index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003). I use two indices to measure this strength.  
I base the first index on Carcello et al. (2002) who show that the audit fee is 
positively associated with effective boards. In particular, they show that board 
independence measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board, the 
board diligence measured by the number of meetings attended, and board expertise 
measured by the number of outside directorships held in other corporations by non-
management directors are all positively associated with the audit fee. I build on their 
model and use an index (GIndexI) that aggregates the following: board independence 
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(measured as the percentage of outside directors); board diligence (measured as the 
number of meetings held 5 ); audit committee independence (measured by the 
percentage 6  of non-affiliated outside directors on the audit committee); board 
expertise (measured as the percentage of financial experts on the board + number of 
directorships held by outside directors); and (negative) CEO power (indicator 
variable if CEO is also the chairman or founder or sole insider). Carcello et al. (2002) 
provide justification for including board independence, board diligence and the 
number of directorships held by board numbers; Abbott et al. (2003) provide 
justification for audit committee independence; Carcello et al. (2006) and Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2009) provide justification for including financial expertise 
separately in the board expertise variable; Gul and Leung (2004) and García-Meca 
and Sánchez-Ballesta (2009) provide justification for including CEO power7. I scale 
all the governance variables to range from 0 to 1, add them to get a total measure of 
CG, and adjust for the industry-year mean of the total measure to obtain the index8 
and classify the firms that have above-median index as “Good CG” firms and those 
with below-median index as “Poor CG” firms.  
My second index (GIndexII) is based on Larcker et al. (2007). Their index spans 
a larger number of factors. For example, the board independence variable includes 
the percentage of female directors, which is consistent with the finding that boards 
with female directors monitor company management more closely (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009), have less earnings management (Gul et al. 2007), and demand more 
auditing (Gul et al. 2008). Consistent with their analysis, I aggregate the following in 
my construction of the index: board independence (measured as the percentage of 
                                                            
5 All variables that are not indicator variables or fractions are scaled to a value between 0 and 1 by 
dividing by the maximum value obtained in the sample.  
 
6  The terms percentage and fraction are used interchangeably and denote the fraction between 0 and 1. 
 
7  The use of CEO Power rather than CEO duality is based on Dechow et al. (1996). 
 
8  Use of principal component analysis instead of simple aggregation does not change the result. It is 
not clear whether a different weighted aggregation of these factors gives a better indication of internal 
corporate governance. Therefore, we present the results using simple aggregation. The results based 
on principal component analysis of CG are available and will be provided on request. 
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outsiders – percentage of affiliated directors + percentage of female directors); board 
diligence (measured as the scaled number of meetings held + fraction of directors 
who attend more than 75% of the meetings); board experience (measured as the 
tenure given by the average number of years the directors have served on the board + 
percentage of directors who are above 70 years of age); board and audit committee 
sizes (board size + audit committee size); the busy directors (fraction of outside 
directors who serve on four or more boards + fraction of inside directors who serve 
on two or more other boards), and the (negative) CEO power. As in the case of 
GIndexI, I add these variables to obtain the index and classify the firms that have 
above-median index as “Good CG” firms and those with below-median index as 
“Poor CG” firms. 
I run the regression equations (1) and (2) on both the poor CG and good CG 
sub-samples using GIndexI  and GIndexII  separately. Hypothesis H2a will be 
satisfied if the coefficient β4  in specialist choice model (equation1) is significantly 
positive for  the good CG sub-sample but not for the poor CG sub-sample and 
Hypothesis H2b will be satisfied if the coefficient β11 in the audit fee model (equation 
2) is significantly negative for the poor CG sub-sample but not for the good CG sub-
sample. 
Besides the analyses on the sub-samples, I also use the following model to test 
H2b.  I use the dummy DGIndex to capture the effect of internal governance on audit 
fees, and use the interaction term OWN*DGIndex to test the joint effect of good 
internal governance and family ownership on the audit fees.  
 
 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE  
+ β7ROA + β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIA + β11OWN  
+ β12DGIndex + β13OWN*DGIndex  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε                                              (3)  
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In the above model, OWN = Family or FamilyPlus and DGIndex= DGIndexI or 
DGIndexII. If the coefficient β13 is positive and significant in the corresponding 
regressions, it validates Hypothesis H2b. 
 
For testing H2c, I include an indicator variable SPECIALIST in the regression (2) 
to capture the effect of specialist auditor on audit fees.  I use the following model: 
 
LNFEE = β0+ β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE 
 + β7ROA + β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN  
+ β12SPECIALIST + Industry effects + Year effects + ε                   (4) 
 
In the above model, SPECIALIST is the experimental variable, which is coded 1 
if auditor is the city leader in the SIC 2-digit industry by clients’ sales. 
I run regression model (4) on both the poor CG and good CG sub-samples using 
GIndexI and GIndexII separately. Hypothesis H2c will be satisfied if the coefficient 
β12 is significantly greater for the poor CG sub-sample than for the good CG sub-
sample.  
 
4.2 Data sources and sample selection 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 affected the corporate governance processes in 
firms, the work of auditors with respect to the internal control systems, the sensitivity 
of auditors to weaknesses in internal controls, and accrual estimates by managers and 
the overall litigation atmosphere (Ascioglu et al. 2005; Asthana et al. 2004; Bartov 
and Cohen 2006; Chambers and Payne 2008; Ciesielski and Weirich 2006; Griffin et 
al. 2008; Harrington 2003; Kinney et al. 2004). In view of this, my analysis is carried 
out in the post-Sarbanes Oxley period spanning the years from 2003 through 2008. 
Data on family ownership, founder, insider holdings and CEO holdings as well as 
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board information regarding the directors are obtained from the Corporate Library’s 
Board Analyst database. The Board Analyst provides data on family ownership only 
from 2004 to 2008. I assume that if a firm is family-controlled in 2004, it is also 
family controlled in 20039. Board Analyst offers coverage for public companies of 
the S&P 500, S&P MidCaps 400, S&P SmallCaps 600, Fortune 1000, Russell 3000 
and S&P/TSX 60. By giving coverage to midcaps and small caps, the database has 
reduced the large company bias10. For the period from 2003-2008, we get an initial 
sample of 15,479 firm-year observations. After subtracting the firm-years for which 
the ownership data (family, CEO, insider or founder) are missing (979 cases), we are 
left with 14,500 firm-year observations.  
Data on audit fees are obtained from the AuditAnalytics database. In the sample 
of 14,500 observations obtained from Corporate Library, 258 are missing from 
AuditAnalytics which leaves us with a sample of 14,242. Subtracting the missing 
observations on board meetings and financial experts on the audit committee (273 
cases), we have 13,969 observations left. Data on market value, net income, leverage 
etc. are obtained from the financial statements on S&P’s Compustat database. 
Matching with Compustat further reduces the sample by 697 observations. Of the 
remaining 13,272 observations, 134 have missing information on 
mergers/acquisitions (Compustat data item SALE_FN) or special items (Compustat 
data item SPI). Further, we eliminate all the data on financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999), which further reduces the sample by 2,772. This leaves us with a net usable 
sample of 10,366 firm-years. The sample selection is summarized in Panel A of 
Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
                                                            
9  Analysis of the period from 2004 to 2008 also gives results that are not qualitatively different from 
the ones presented here.  
 
10  Larger firms are more likely to disclose information on their corporate governance and other 
practices and therefore, it is impossible to completely avoid the large firm bias, irrespective of which 
database is used for analysis. 
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4.3 Descriptive details of the sample 
 
Panel B of Table 2 gives the distribution of sample firms over the six years 
spanning the period 2003-2008 across the thirteen different industry categories used 
by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Frankel et al. (2002) based on SIC codes. The 
distribution that is not very different from the distribution of the Compustat database. 
Panel C gives the descriptive statistics of the variables. Audit fee has a mean and 
median that are very significantly higher than the ones reported in Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), which is suggestive of the increase in audit fees after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Consistent with prior studies, more than 90% of the firms are audited by the big-4 
auditors. On average, CEO holdings constitute 2.7% of outstanding shares and 7.2% 
of the firms are classified as family firms. A founder director serves on the boards of 
21.3% of the firms. On average, the board meets 8 times a year. The average board 
size is 8.7 and the average size of the audit committee is 3.7. 94% of the audit 
committee members are unaffiliated outsiders. Of the audit committee members, 
36% have financial expertise. 
Table 3 gives the Pearson (Spearman) correlations. The two governance indices 
exhibit a 67% (68%) correlation. As expected, the audit fee is correlated with firm 
size [61% (60%)]. A strong negative correlation [-43% (-42%)] is found between 
firm size and loss propensity. Although Family is negatively correlated with LNFEE, 
the correlation is only -.04 (-.03). In general, the correlations between independent 
variables are small and are unlikely to result in multicollinearity. 
Insert Table 3 here 
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Chapter 5. Hypothesis Tests and Result Analyses 
 
5.1 Univariate tests for audit fees 
 
Table 4 presents univariate tests of audit fee differences between (i) family 
firms and non-family firms; (ii) firms with below-median CEO holdings and those 
with above-median CEO holdings; (iii) firms with and without founder directors; and 
(iv) firms with low and high insider director holdings. The audit fee is significantly 
lower for family firms compared to non-family firms, for firms with high CEO 
holdings compared to firms with low CEO holdings, firms with founder directors 
compared to those that don’t, and for firms that have high insider holdings compared 
to those with low insider holdings. These results suggest that auditors respond to the 
reduction of the Type 1 agency problem by reducing their audit effort and, in general, 
this is not offset by an increase of the Type 2 agency problem, thus validating H1b. 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
5.2 Testing Hypotheses H1a and H1b 
 
Table 5 gives the results of regression (1). The first column gives the results 
when OWN = Family. The second column gives the results when OWN = 
FamilyPlus. The coefficient β4 is positive and significant in both the columns, which 
validates Hypothesis H1a, showing that family firms are more likely to choose 
specialist auditors, consistent with the argument that family owners are more likely 
to signal the non-expropriation motivation to the market than nonfamily firms.    
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Table 6 gives the results of regression equation (2). The first column gives the 
results when OWN = Family. The second column gives the results when OWN = 
FamilyPlus. The coefficient β11 is negative and significant in both the columns, 
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which validates Hypothesis H1b, consistent with the argument that the reduction of 
Type 1 agency cost reduces the audit fee and the increase in Type 2 agency cost is 
not sufficient to make the coefficient insignificant. This result suggests that, in 
general, the effects of the Type 1 agency conflict dominate the effects of Type 2 
agency conflict in the determination of auditor effort and fees. 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
Consistent with prior studies and my expectation, the audit fee is higher for the 
big-4 auditors, positively associated with client firm size, leverage, inventory and 
receivables, loss and special items. Contrary to my expectations but consistent with 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003), financing and market-to-book variables are negatively 
associated with audit fees. The coefficients in the two regressions are not very 
different from each other, which suggests that the two OWN variables do not affect 
the relation between the other control variables and audit fees. The adjusted R-
squares of 0.637 and 0.636 in the two regressions, respectively, are comparable to the 
adjusted R-square of 0.66 in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). This comparability of the R-
squares metric shows that the audit fee model seems to be as valid in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley period as it was before the Act.  
 
5.3 Testing Hypotheses H2a and H2b 
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide the results of regression equation (1) on sub-samples of 
firms with poor and good internal governance. For the sake of easy readability, the 
columns of Table 5 using the full sample are repeated in the first column of Table 7 
and the first column of Table 8. Columns 2 and 3 give the results of the regression 
for the two governance-differentiated sub-samples when governance is based on 
GIndexI. Likewise, Columns 4 and 5 give the results of the regression for the two 
governance-differentiated sub-samples when governance is based on GIndexII. In 
both cases, Family and FamilyPlus are significantly positively related to specialist 
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auditor choice only when the internal governance is good but loses significance when 
the internal governance is poor. This is consistent with the hypothesis that when 
family-owners value their private benefits highly, they adopt weak internal 
governance and in this case, they have no incentive to signal the market through 
choosing a specialist auditor.   
Insert Tables 7 and 8 here  
 
Tables 9 and 10 provide the results of regression equation (2) on the sub-
samples of firms with poor and good internal governance. Family and FamilyPlus are 
significantly negatively related to audit fee only when the internal governance is poor 
but loses significance when the internal governance is strong. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that when family-owners value their private benefits highly, they 
adopt weak internal governance and in this case they do not incentivize the auditors 
to mitigate the Type 2 agency problem. As a result, there is a significant negative 
relation between audit fees and family ownership. On the other hand, when the 
family-owners want to signal that they will not expropriate, they adopt strong 
internal governance and incentivize the auditors to mitigate the agency concerns of 
non-family investors and therefore the reduction in audit effort driven by the 
reduction of the Type 1 agency problem is compensated by an increase in audit effort 
to reduce the Type 2 agency problem.  In effect, when the internal governance is 
strong, the audit fee is not reduced by family ownership. This effect is also shown in 
Figure 1.  Figure 1 provides a picture of expected audit fees with and without family 
ownership in the cases of strong and weak internal governance. This figure shows 
that the audit fee is expected to be higher in cases where the internal governance is 
strong, both for the family and non-family firms. Furthermore, for firms with poor 
governance, the audit fee in a family firm is obviously smaller than that in a 
nonfamily firm, whereas there is no obvious difference in audit fee between a family 
firm and a nonfamily firm when the corporate governance is strong. 
Insert Tables 9 and 10 and Figure 1 here 
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An examination of the coefficients of the sub-sample regressions shows that 
there are only minor differences between the two sub-samples. This indicates that the 
audit fee model does not exhibit significant structural differences between good-
governance and weak-governance firms.  
Table 11 presents the results of regression equation (3) on the joint effect of 
family control and good corporate governance on audit fees. The first column gives 
the regression result of the interaction term OWN*DGIndex for OWN=Family and 
DGIndex=DGIndexI, which shows that the interaction term is significantly positively 
associated with audit fees, consistent with my argument that family firms with good 
corporate governance are more likely to signal their non-expropriation behavior by 
purchasing more audit effort. Analogously, for OWN=Family and 
DGIndex=DGIndexII, the interaction term is also significantly positively correlated 
with audit fees, thereby supporting my hypothesis H2b. The last two columns give the 
results for OWN=FamilyPlus. The result shown in third column indicates that there 
is a positively but insignificantly joint effect of family ownership and good corporate 
governance on audit fees, only offering weak evidence to support my hypothesis H2b. 
However, the last column reporting the result for OWN=FamilyPlus and 
DGIndex=DGIndexII shows a significantly positive association between the 
interaction term OWN*DGIndex and LNFEE, which also supports my hypothesis H2b. 
In total, table 11 gives me strong evidence to validate the hypothesis H2b. 
Insert Table 11 here 
 
5.4 Testing Hypothesis H2c   
 
Table 12 provides the results of regression equation (4) on the specialist auditor 
premium. The first column gives the regression results of the full sample, which 
shows that the dummy variable SPECIALIST is significantly positively associated 
with audit fees, consistent with my expectation on the existence of a specialist 
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auditor premium. Columns 2 and 3 give the results of the regression for the two 
governance-differentiated sub-samples when governance is based on GIndexI. 
Likewise, Columns 4 and 5 give the results of the regression for the two governance-
differentiated sub-samples when governance is based on GIndexII. In both cases, 
SPECIALIST is significantly positively correlated to audit fees only when the internal 
governance is poor but loses significance when the internal governance is good. The 
t-value for the difference between the estimated coefficients of SPECIALIST in 
Columns 2 and 3 shows that firms with poor internal governance pay significantly 
more premiums to a specialist auditor than those with good internal governance. 
Likewise, the t-value for the difference between the estimated coefficients of 
SPECIALIST in Columns 4 and 5 also supports the hypothesis that the specialist 
auditor premium is smaller in the presence of stronger boards compared to firms with 
weaker boards. 
The Big auditors are more likely to be specialist auditors than non-Big auditors. 
I therefore calculate a correlation coefficient (0.226) between SPECIALIST and BIG, 
and VIFs in the first regression of Table 12. I find that the correlation is significant 
but not strong enough to cause multicollinearity problems, because the VIF of 
SPECIALIST (BIG) in the first column of Table 12 is 1.07(1.16). 
Insert Table 12 here 
 
5.5 Additional tests using other measures of concentrated holdings 
 
I repeat regression equation (2) using CEO Holdings, insider holdings, and the 
existence of founder director as alternative measures to family ownership. CEO 
ownership aligns the incentives of management with that of the investors and thereby 
reduces the Type 1 agency problem. However, when the CEO is from the family, 
CEO ownership is also connected with the Type 2 agency conflict.  Insider directors 
constitute the top management of the firm and having high ownership aligns their 
interest with those of investors. However, it might also exacerbate the agency 
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problem between insider shareholders and outside shareholders. Existence of a 
founder or his/her heir on the board also could be interpreted as an alignment of the 
management and investor interest. Similar to family ownership, the founder director 
presence might indicate entrenchment and a compromise of the outside shareholders’ 
interests.  
Table 13 shows the results of regression equation (2) using CEO holdings, 
insider holdings, and the existence of a founder director as alternative measures to 
family ownership. In the interest of brevity, only the coefficients of the treatment 
variables are shown. In the full sample regression, CEO holdings, insider ownership 
and Founder director presence show a significant negative association with audit fee. 
In the sub-sample regressions, the significant negative association remains for firms 
with poor governance but the association becomes insignificant for firms with strong 
governance. In effect, these variables exhibit the same consequences as family 
ownership.  
Insert Table 13 here 
 
5.6 Additional tests where sub-samples are formed based on components of the 
internal governance index 
 
Analyses carried out above using the two indices support the general finding 
that in family firms that signal their intent with strong governance, audit fee is not 
different between family and non-family firms. This result could be driven by one or 
a few or all of the governance characteristics. In this additional test, I use some of the 
individual components of the governance indices to examine whether they drive the 
results.  
Table 14 presents the results of sub-sample analyses where sub-samples of 
strong and weak governance are constructed based on (i) percentage of outside 
independent directors; (ii) independence index; (iii) meetings index; (iv) size index; 
and (v) CEO power. The percentage of independent directors has been used in 
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several prior studies as the sole indicator of board-based governance (Adams and 
Ferreira 2007; Andersen et al. 2004; Carcello et al. 2002; Cotter and Sylvester 2003; 
Osma 2008). Therefore, I use these as separate variables. Variables (ii) to (iv) are 
sub-indices from which GIndexII is constructed and relate to highly researched 
indicators of governance such as independence, diligence, and board/audit committee 
size. Variable (v) – CEO power – has also been an important indicator of the 
independence of the board from the CEO (Tsui et al. 2001).  Consistently in all cases, 
Family is negatively associated with audit fee only when the corresponding 
governance variable is poor but the association becomes insignificant when the 
corresponding governance variable is strong. This analysis shows that all governance 
variables have a similar effect and my results are robust.  
Insert Table 14 here 
 
5.7 Additional tests for the effect of firm size on the relationship between family 
ownership and audit fees. 
 
Larger family firms come under greater public scrutiny and consequently the 
potential for benefitting from private control benefits is less. Moreover, in larger 
family firms, the external shareholders are more numerous and therefore have a 
greater incentive for class action lawsuits compared to the external shareholders in 
small family firms. Therefore, the litigation risk faced by auditors is relatively higher 
than in small family firms. The big family firms purchase more audit to satisfy the 
stronger external concerns, whereas the small family firms have no similar 
motivation because of weaker external concerns. Thus, I hypothesize that the 
negative relationship between audit fee and family ownership is weaker in large 
firms than in small firms.   
To validate the above hypothesis, I use extreme size observations (bottom 25% 
and top 25%) and a matched-pair, nonfamily firm. Here, I rank the family firms by 
size and isolate those in the lowest and highest quartiles (n=187 for the lowest and 
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n=187 for the highest). Then, I match each of these firms with a non-family firm in 
the same industry and that is nearest in size. Thus, I end up with a sample of 374 
small size firms (187 family obs. and 187 nonfamily obs.) and 374 large size firms. I 
also combine the two samples (n=748). 
The regression results are reported in table 15. As expected, the significant, 
negative association between family ownership and audit fee still appears in the 
combined sample. However, the lowest and highest quartile regression results show 
that the negative relationship only is significant for firms in the lowest quartile but 
not for firms in the highest quartile. Thus, large family firms, which face a lot of 
media attention, do not have lower audit fees. 
Insert Table 15 here 
 
5.9 Additional tests for small firms 
 
Unlike large family firms, small family firms are not subject to great scrutiny 
from the market.  The reason why large family firms set up strong boards, choose 
specialist auditors, and purchase more audit effort is likely to be the result of external 
scrutiny. However, when small family firms choose strong boards, specialist auditors, 
and higher audit fees, this is more likely to be result of voluntarily signaling their 
non-expropriation behavior. Based on this reasoning, I rerun regression equations (1) 
– (3) and find that in small firms the positive effect of family ownership on specialist 
auditor choice shown in table 16 is stronger than that shown in table 7, and the joint 
positive effect of family ownership and good corporate governance on audit fees 
reported in table 17 is stronger than that presented in table 11.    
   Comparing table 7 with table 16, I find that the estimated coefficients on OWN 
in table 16 are greater than their counterparts in table 7.  To verify this observation, I 
calculate the t-value for the difference in coefficients. For example, in the full sample 
regression, the t-value for the coefficients difference for OWN shows a significant 
difference between the estimated coefficients. Likewise, the comparison between 
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table 11 and table 17 shows that the estimated coefficients of the interaction term 
OWN*DGIndex in table 17 are greater than their counterparts in table 11. T statistical 
tests show that such differences are significant. In total, these evidences validate my 
expectation that small family firms are more likely to signal their non-expropriation 
behavior compared to large family firms. 
 
Insert Tables 16 and 17 here 
 
5.10 Additional test when managerial ownership is very high and entrenchment is 
indicated 
 
Several studies have documented non-linear effects of managerial ownership on 
governance (Yeo et al. 2002; Morck et al. 1988). These studies suggest that at very 
high levels of managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect dominates the 
alignment effect. Therefore, if the managerial ownership is very high, we do not 
expect family ownership to reduce the Type 1 agency cost and the audit fee is not 
expected to be lower in family firms. In order to test this, we select the top quartile of 
the CEO ownership sub-sample and run regression equation (2) on this sample. The 
results are shown in Table 18. As expected, the negative association between family 
ownership and audit fee disappears in this case. The entrenched CEO dominates 
other governance effects.  
 
Insert Table 18 here 
5.11 Additional test on the benefit of using corporate governance (auditing) as a 
signal mechanism for family firms. 
    As an additional test, I test the effect of corporate governance on a firm’s credit 
rating. I use the model in Francis et al. (2008), and report the results in Table 19.  As 
expected, family firms get a higher credit rating in the full sample analysis. The 
separate sample analyses show that such effect is driven by the family firms with 
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good CG. These results indicate that family firms can benefit from setting up good 
corporate governance which necessarily leads to higher quality audit. 
Insert Table 19 here 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I examine the effect of family ownership on auditor choice and 
audit pricing. Family ownership of firms results in a reduction of the agency conflict 
between managers and investors because of the superior knowledge of the family 
owners about the business that allows them to monitor the managers more effectively. 
Given the concerns of nonfamily investors on the expropriation of family owners, the 
family firms are more likely to signal their non-expropriation incentive by choosing a 
specialist auditor. Furthermore, given that the primary role of auditors is to reduce 
the information asymmetry between managers and investors, this alignment effect 
reduces audit risk from mis-reporting by managers and, in a competitive audit market, 
is expected to lead to lower audit fees for family firms. On the other hand, the family 
owners could have incentives for consuming private benefits and this creates an 
agency conflict with non-family shareholders. Although it is not the primary role of 
auditors to mitigate agency conflicts between different classes of investors, prior 
evidence suggests that in contexts where they have the incentive, auditors have the 
capability to mitigate the agency conflict between inside and outside investors. 
These arguments inevitably lead to three questions that I answer in this thesis. 
The first is whether family firms are more likely to choose a specialist auditor to 
signal their non-expropriating behavior compared to nonfamily firms, which do not 
confront the Type 2 agency conflict as family firms do. The second is whether the 
Type 1 agency conflict dominates the Type 2 agency conflict in the determination of 
audit effort and audit fees. The third is that in contexts where the family owners 
genuinely are not consuming private benefits and expropriating the wealth of non-
family shareholders, do they provide incentives to the auditors to address the 
concerns of non-family shareholders? I address these questions in this paper. I find 
that, in general, family firms are more likely to choose a specialist auditor to signal 
their non-expropriation behavior than nonfamily firms, and that the Type 1 agency 
conflict dominates the Type 2 agency conflict in the determination of audit effort and 
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pricing. In order to address the third question, I surmise that family owners who do 
not expropriate wealth from non-family owners will use strong independent and 
competent internal governance mechanisms to signal their honesty. Therefore, in the 
presence of strong internal governance, the owners are more likely to choose 
specialist auditors and provide incentives to auditors to mitigate the concerns of non-
family owners and therefore, the potential reduction in audit effort because the 
reduced Type 1 agency conflict is compensated by an increase in the audit effort 
needed to mitigate the concerns of the non-family owners. I find that the positive 
relation between family ownership and specialist auditor choice is stronger in the 
presence of strong internal governance but is insignificant if the internal governance 
is weak, and the negative relation between family ownership and audit fee disappears 
in the presence of strong internal governance but is significant if the internal 
governance is weak.  
I find that the results are robust to using alternate measures of ownership such 
as CEO ownership, insider ownership, and the presence of founder directors. I also 
find that the result is driven by individual internal governance factors such as 
board/audit committee independence, board diligence, board/audit committee size, 
and CEO power.  I also document that among family firms, the audit fee is relatively 
higher in larger firms and therefore these firms do not show significantly lower audit 
fees compared to nonfamily firms. Furthermore, if the entrenchment effect of 
managerial ownership is very strong, the effect of family ownership on audit fee 
disappears.  
My thesis investigates auditor choice and auditor responses to agency conflicts 
in family firms that have effective (ineffective) internal governance. The findings in 
this thesis are valuable to regulators who might want to improve information flow to 
nonfamily shareholders, nonfamily shareholders in assessing the motives of family 
shareholders, auditing and accounting standard setters in redefining the role of 
auditors, and family shareholders who want to signal non-expropriation of nonfamily 
shareholder wealth. 
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There are several directions for future research. First of all, there is the question 
why Big 4 is not used as a quality signaling vehicle rather than a specialist auditor in 
family firms. A potential explanation is based on the fact that 91% of US firms in my 
sample choose Big 4 auditors, but only 62% of US firms use specialist auditors. This 
fact shows that using Big 4 as a signal is less likely to achieve a separating 
equilibrium than using specialist auditors. I thus think that specialist auditors are 
likely to be a more effective signal than Big 4. However, my conjecture is still very 
fragile and further research is needed to investigate this question. 
My thesis is based on the US market. The applicability of the story in my thesis 
to other markets is not known with any degree of certainty. Thus to test the 
applicability of my story in other markets, especially eastern markets such as Hong 
Kong and China, is a very interesting topic because the differences in institutional 
environments and cultures between US and eastern markets is huge. These 
differences might mitigate the applicability of the story. This calls out for more 
research. 
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Figure 1 
Audit fees and family ownership under poor and good governance 
 
GIndexI GIndexII 
a The Y-axis shows the expected audit fees with Family = 1 or 0 as the case might 
be, after controlling other effects. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Dependent variables:   
LNFEE = natural log of audit fees; 
SPECIALIST = 1 if auditor is the city leader in the SIC 2-digit industry by clients’ sales, otherwise 0; 
Control Variables: 
BIG = 1 if the auditor is PWC, EY, DTT, or KPMG, and 0 otherwise; 
LNMVE = natural log of market value (Compustat data item CSHO times Compustat data item 
PRCC_F); 
MA = 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition  (as reported in SALE_FN of 
Compustat), and 0 otherwise; 
FINANCING = 1 if MA is not equal to 1 and any of the following conditions apply: long term debt 
increased by 20 percent or more, number of shares outstanding increased by 10 
percent or more after controlling for stock splits, and 0 otherwise; 
MB = market value (Compustat data item CSHO times Compustat data item PRCC_F) 
divided by stockholders’ equity of common shareholders (Compustat data item SEQ);
LEVE = total assets less stockholders’ equity of common shareholders divided by total assets 
(Compustat data item AT); 
ROA = net income before extraordinary items  (Compustat data item IB) divided by total 
assets; 
INVREC = sum of a firm’s receivables (Compustat data item RECT) and inventory  (Computstat 
data item INVT) divided by total assets; 
LOSS = 1 if the firm’s ROA is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
SPECIAL = 1 if the firm reports special items (Computstat data item SPI), and 0 otherwise; 
Experimental Variables:  
Family = 1 if the firm where family ties, most often going back a generation or two to the 
founder, play a key role in both ownership (>=20%) and board membership, and 0 
otherwise; 
FamilyPlus = 1 if Family is valued one or the firm has at least one founder who sits in the board as 
well as there is dual class stock that creates a wedge between cash flow rights & 
control rights in the firm, otherwise 0. 
CEO Holdings = fraction of outstanding shares held by the CEO; 
Insiders Holdings = fraction of outstanding shares held by insider directors; 
Founder = 1 if one or more directors are the firms’founders;  
Corporate Governance Variables: 
%Outsiders = fraction of outside directors who serve on the board;  
%affiliated  = fraction of affiliated directors who serve on the board; 
%Female = fraction of female outside directors to all outside directors; 
CEO Power = 1if the CEO is the Chairman, founder, or sole insider, and 0 otherwise; 
Tenure = average number of years directors serve; 
%Old  = fraction of directors who are older than 70; 
#Board Meetings = number of board meetings in a year; 
% Attended  = fraction of directors who meet attendance standards (75% attendance); 
Board Size = number of directors serving on the board; 
AC Size = number of directors serving on the audit committee; 
%Busy Affiliated or 
Outsider 
= fraction of affiliated or outside directors who serve on four or more other boards; 
%Busy Insiders = fraction of inside directors who serve on two or more other boards; 
Directorships = average number of other boards on which outside directors serve; 
%Outsiders AC = fraction of outside directors who serve on the audit committee; 
%Financial Experts = fraction of accounting or financial experts who serve on the audit committee; 
Independence Index = %Outsiders - %affiliated + %Female 
Power Index = CEO Power 
Old Index = Tenure + %Old  
Meetings Index = #Board Meetings + % Attended  
Size Index = Board Size + AC Size 
Busy Index = %Busy Affiliated or Outsiders + %Busy Insiders 
GIndexI = %Outsiders + #Board Meetings – CEO Power + %Outsiders AC + %Financial 
Experts + Directorships; 
GIndexII = Independence Index + Meetings Index – Power index + Old Index + Size Index + 
Busy Index; 
DGIndexI = 1 if GIndexI is above its median value, otherwise zero; 
DGIndexII = 1 if GIndexII is above its median value, otherwise zero; 
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Table 2 
 Sample Details 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
  2003-2008
Initial sample : firm-year observations in Companies of Corporate Library   15479
Less     
Observations with missing CEO/insiders/family/founder holdings in Corporate Library  -979
     14500
Observations not included in AuditAnalytics  -258
  14242
Observations missing number of board meetings/financial experts of audit committee in 
Corporate Library to compile governance indexes  -273
    13969
Observations not included in Computstat  -697
    13272
Observations missing footnote of sale (Computstat data item SALE_FN)/special item 
(Computstat data item SPI) /net income (Computstat data item IB)  -134
  13138
Observations in financial industries (6000-6999)  -2772
Final firm-year observations  10366
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Panel B: Distribution of the sample firms over the sample period and across 
industries 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008  Total 
Agriculture (0100-0999) 3 4 5 6 4  3  25
Mining and Construction (1000-1999,  
excluding 1300-1399) 20 32 32 50 50
 60  244
Food (2000-2111) 20 40 46 56 59  53  274
Textiles and printing/ 
publishing (2200-2799) 75 102 102 119 117
 108  623
Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899) 34 46 52 66 70  64  332
Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836) 46 61 67 150 164  166  654
Extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999) 43 54 58 93 113  121  482
Durable manufactures (3000-3999,  
excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679) 232 353 354 503 507
 494  2443
Transportation (4000-4899) 73 95 98 149 161  168  744
Utilities (4900-4999) 72 88 90 103 98  101  552
Retail (5000-5999) 123 199 189 256 261  254  1282
Services (7000-8999,  
excluding 7370-7379) 88 141 147 237 234
 224  1071
Computers (3570-3579,  
3670-3679, 7370-7379) 129 216 228 336 342
 347  1598
Others  6 7 9 8 6  6  42
Total  964 1438 1477 2132 2186  2169  10366
aSIC codes are given in parentheses. 
 
Panel C: Descriptive 
StatisticsVariable Mean
Std. 
Dev. Q1 Median  Q3
FEE($) 2906699
499559
7 766000
145875
5 
 298600
0
MVE(M$) 5328.204
13448.
61
422.53
62
1173.8
91 
 3629.5
89
LNFEE 14.254 1.074 13.549 14.193   14.909 
SPECIALIST 0.623 0.484 0.000 1.000  1.000
LNMVE  7.145 1.686 6.046 7.068   8.197 
BIG 0.912 0.283 1.000 1.000  1.000
MA  0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000   0.000 
FINANCING  0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000   1.000 
MB  2.734 1.983 1.379 2.140   3.493 
LEVE  0.523 0.222 0.354 0.522   0.679 
ROA  0.007 0.168 0.004 0.044   0.083 
INVREC  0.236 0.155 0.103 0.214   0.339 
LOSS  0.239 0.426 0.000 0.000   0.000 
SPECIAL  0.730 0.444 0.000 1.000   1.000 
CEO Holdings  0.027 0.079 0.001 0.003   0.012 
Family 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000   0.000 
Insiders Holdings  0.044 0.102 0.002 0.007   0.028 
Founder 0.213 0.410 0.000 0.000   0.000 
GIndexI  -0.009 0.627 -0.469 -0.046   0.422 
GIndexII  -0.007 0.510 -0.393 -0.096   0.383 
%Outsiders  0.705 0.150 0.600 0.714   0.833 
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%affiliated 0.113 0.129 0.000 0.100   0.182 
%Female  0.138 0.149 0.000 0.125   0.222 
CEO Power 0.667 0.471 0.000 1.000   1.000 
Tenure  8.629 3.931 5.818 8.129   10.857 
%Old  0.189 0.195 0.000 0.143   0.286 
#Board Meetings 7.922 3.590 5.000 7.000   9.000 
% Attended    0.987 0.043 1.000 1.000   1.000 
Board Size 8.754 2.202 7.000 9.000   10.000 
AC Size 3.728 1.034 3.000 3.000   4.000 
%Busy affiliated or outsiders 0.149 0.174 0.000 0.111   0.250 
%Busy Insiders 0.068 0.086 0.000 0.000   0.125 
Directorships  2.033 0.922 1.333 1.833   2.600 
%Outsiders AC 0.938 0.135 1.000 1.000   1.000 
%Financial Experts  0.360 0.294 0.200 0.333   0.500 
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 Correlation matrix 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
LNFEE(1)  -0.26 -0.03 -0.27 -0.16 0.14 0.16 0.26  0.60 0.11 -0.23 0.02 0.35 0.06 0.08 -0.14  0.26  
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
CEO Holdings(2) -0.16  0.11 0.77 0.15 -0.33 -0.30 -0.13  -0.29 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.03  -0.10  
 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01  0.00  
Family(3) -0.04  0.21 0.18 0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.05  -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02  -0.02  
 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.46 0.00 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.08  0.04  
Insiders Holdings(4) -0.17  0.84 0.27 0.25 -0.17 -0.11 -0.18  -0.33 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 0.08 0.07  -0.10  
 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
Founder(5) -0.15  0.13 0.00 0.17 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.10 0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.19 -0.02 -0.09 0.08  -0.05  
 0.00  0.00 0.99 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00  0.00  
GIndexI(6) 0.15  -0.23 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08 0.68 0.06  0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.04  0.09  
 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.69 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00  0.00  
GIndexII(7) 0.15  -0.19 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.67 0.07  0.18 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.06  0.05  
 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
BIG(8) 0.27  -0.14 -0.05 -0.17 -0.08 0.06 0.06  0.30 0.04 -0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 -0.03 -0.12  0.07  
 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00  
LNMVE(9) 0.61  -0.13 -0.05 -0.15 -0.09 0.08 0.16 0.30  0.09 -0.17 0.42 0.13 0.43 -0.11 -0.42  0.05  
 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
MA(10) 0.10  -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04  0.09 -0.35 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06  0.06  
 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.37 0.59 0.04 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.16 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.00  0.00  
FINANCING(11) -0.22  0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10  -0.16 -0.35 0.06 -0.21 0.00 -0.05 0.09  -0.10  
 0.00  0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00  0.00  
MB(12) 0.01  0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05  0.35 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.45 -0.02 -0.26  -0.12  
 0.36  0.97 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.00  0.00 0.09 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.00  
LEVE(13) 0.34  -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 -0.19 0.08 0.02 0.12  0.08 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 -0.26 -0.03 0.12  0.18  
   42
 0.00  0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00  0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
ROA(14) 0.17  0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.12  0.44 0.05 -0.09 0.17 -0.17 0.17 -0.74  -0.19  
 0.00  0.38 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  
INVREC(15) 0.04  0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.03  -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.13 -0.12  -0.01  
 0.00  0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00  0.00  0.61  
LOSS(16) -0.13  0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.12  -0.43 -0.06 0.09 -0.15 0.14 -0.68 -0.09 0.14  
 0.00  0.15 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
SPECIAL(17) 0.24  -0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.05 0.07  0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 0.18 -0.10 -0.02 0.14   
 0.00  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00   
a The numbers in parentheses are the two-tailed significance levels; 
b Spearman (Pearson) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal. 
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Table 4 
 Difference in audit fees between firms with and without concentrated holdings 
 
  Obs. Mean Difference  T 
Family=0  9616 14.265 0.153   (3.773)*** 
Family=1  750 14.112   
Low CEO Holdings  5183 14.529  0.549   (26.950 )*** 
High CEO Holdings  5183 13.979    
Founder =0  8153 14.339 0.396   (15.573)*** 
Founder =1  2213 13.943   
Low Insiders Holdings  5183 14.531 0.553   (27.139)*** 
High Insiders Holdings   5183 13.978   
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Median values of CEO/Insiders holdings are used to partition the subsamples.
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Table 5 
Family ownership and specialist auditor choice:  OWN = Family/FamilyPlus  
 
SPECIALIST = β0 + β1LNMVE + β2LEVE +β3ROA + β4OWN  
                              + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
Variables  OWN=Family  OWN = FamilyPlus 
Intercept  -2.271***  -2.229*** 
  (0.120)  (0.119) 
LNMVE  0.295***  0.287*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
LEVE  1.126***  1.142*** 
  (0.103)  (0.103) 
ROA  0.091  0.138 
  (0.148)  (0.148) 
OWN  0.154*  0.154** 
  (0.083)  (0.074) 
Observations  10366  10366 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed Z significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table.
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Table 6 
Family ownership and audit fees:  OWN = Family/FamilyPlus  
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA  
+ β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
Variable  OWN=Family  OWN = FamilyPlus 
Intercept   10.610***  10.606*** 
  (0.262)  (0.263) 
BIG  0.236***  0.235*** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) 
LNMVE  0.479***  0.480*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
MA  0.011  0.012 
  (0.020)  (0.020) 
FINANCING  -0.074***  -0.073*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
MB   -0.123***  -0.123*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
LEVE  1.341***  1.340*** 
  (0.062)  (0.062) 
ROA  -0.115  -0.116 
  (0.092)  (0.092) 
INVREC  0.937***  0.936*** 
  (0.089)  (0.089) 
LOSS  0.232***  0.232*** 
  (0.029)  (0.029) 
SPECIAL  0.244***  0.245*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020) 
OWN  -0.077**  -0.064* 
  (0.039)  (0.036) 
Observations  10366  10366 
R-squared  0.636  0.636 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
   46
 
 
Table 7 
Family ownership and specialist auditor choice:  OWN = Family  
 
SPECIALIST = β0 + β1LNMVE + β2LEVE + β3ROA + β4OWN  
                             + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
   GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variables  Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept  -2.271*** -2.736*** -1.904*** -2.398***  -2.177*** 
  (0.120) (0.178) (0.166) (0.177)  (0.166) 
LNMVE  0.295*** 0.361*** 0.277*** 0.294***  0.292*** 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.021) 
LEVE  1.126*** 1.467*** 0.921*** 1.285***  0.859*** 
  (0.103) (0.150) (0.146) (0.143)  (0.150) 
ROA  0.091 0.010 0.152 0.165  0.039 
  (0.148) (0.218) (0.207) (0.216)  (0.206) 
OWN  0.154* 0.026 0.253** 0.011  0.295** 
  (0.083) (0.111) (0.127) (0.118)  (0.118) 
Observations  10366 5183 5183 5183  5183 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed Z significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 8 
Family ownership and specialist auditor choice:  OWN = FamilyPlus  
 
SPECIALIST = β0+ β1LNMVE + β2LEVE + β3ROA + β4OWN  
                             + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
    GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variables  Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept  -2.229***  -2.689*** -1.889*** -2.400***  -2.168*** 
  (0.119)  (0.177) (0.165) (0.178)  (0.166) 
LNMVE  0.287***  0.337*** 0.257*** 0.294***  0.291*** 
  (0.016)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)  (0.021) 
LEVE  1.142***  1.379*** 0.893*** 1.285***  0.862*** 
  (0.103)  (0.148) (0.145) (0.143)  (0.150) 
ROA  0.138  0.015 0.172 0.164  0.050 
  (0.148)  (0.216) (0.205) (0.215)  (0.206) 
OWN   0.154**  0.050 0.224** 0.022  0.222** 
   (0.074)  (0.099) (0.113) (0.104)  (0.107) 
Observations  10366  5183 5183 5183  5183 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed Z significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 9 
Family ownership effect separated into good and poor CG sub-samples: OWN=Family 
 
LNFEE= β0+ β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA + β8INVREC  
+ β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
   GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variable Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept 10.610*** 10.456*** 10.743*** 10.853***  10.455***
 (0.262) (0.241) (0.347) (0.442)  (0.265) 
BIG 0.236*** 0.297*** 0.165*** 0.255***  0.221*** 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)  (0.056) 
LNMVE 0.479*** 0.465*** 0.484*** 0.450***  0.492*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.011) 
MA 0.011 0.006 0.017 -0.005  0.040 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)  (0.027) 
FINANCING -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.051** -0.079***  -0.063** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.026) 
MB  -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.121***  -0.121***
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) 
LEVE 1.341*** 1.219*** 1.412*** 1.288***  1.376*** 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.082) (0.078)  (0.084) 
ROA -0.115 -0.151 -0.083 -0.207*  -0.016 
 (0.092) (0.134) (0.118) (0.112)  (0.122) 
INVREC 0.937*** 0.949*** 0.923*** 0.936***  0.908*** 
 (0.089) (0.109) (0.116) (0.104)  (0.122) 
LOSS 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.212***  0.241*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)  (0.038) 
SPECIAL 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.239*** 0.242***  0.255*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024)  (0.030) 
OWN -0.077** -0.109** -0.009 -0.164***  0.005 
 (0.039) (0.048) (0.056) (0.054)  (0.050) 
Observations 10366 5183 5183 5183  5183 
R-squared 0.636 0.622 0.649 0.597  0.663 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 10 
Family ownership effect separated into good and poor CG sub-samples: OWN=FamliyPlus 
 
 LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA  
+ β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
 
   GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variable Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept 10.606*** 10.449*** 10.744*** 10.849***  10.452*** 
 (0.263) (0.243) (0.347) (0.444)  (0.265) 
BIG 0.235*** 0.296*** 0.164*** 0.251***  0.222*** 
 (0.041) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)  (0.056) 
LNMVE 0.480*** 0.465*** 0.484*** 0.451***  0.492*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.011) 
MA 0.012 0.008 0.017 -0.002  0.040 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)  (0.027) 
FINANCING -0.073*** -0.101*** -0.051** -0.078***  -0.063** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.026) 
MB  -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.121***  -0.121*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) 
LEVE 1.340*** 1.217*** 1.411*** 1.287***  1.377*** 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.082) (0.077)  (0.084) 
ROA -0.116 -0.150 -0.083 -0.205*  -0.016 
 (0.092) (0.134) (0.118) (0.112)  (0.122) 
INVREC 0.936*** 0.946*** 0.923*** 0.929***  0.908*** 
 (0.089) (0.109) (0.116) (0.104)  (0.122) 
LOSS 0.232*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.215***  0.241*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)  (0.038) 
SPECIAL 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.239*** 0.243***  0.255*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024)  (0.030) 
OWN -0.064* -0.087** -0.014 -0.144***  0.017 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.050) (0.049)  (0.048) 
Observations 10366 5183 5183 5183  5183 
R-squared 0.636 0.622 0.649 0.597  0.663 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 11   
The joint effect of family control and good corporate governance on audit fees 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA  
                     + β8INVREC + β9 LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + β12DGIndex  
                     + β13OWN*DGIndex + Industry effects+ Year effects + ε              
 
Variables  
OWN= 
Family 
DGIndex= 
DGIndexI 
OWN= 
Family 
DGIndex= 
DGIndexII 
OWN= 
FamilyPlus 
DGIndex= 
DGIndexI 
 
OWN= 
FamilyPlus 
DGIndex= 
DGIndexII 
Intercept   10.586*** 10.612*** 10.582***  10.610*** 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.258)  (0.262) 
BIG  0.233*** 0.239*** 0.232***  0.237*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.041)  (0.041) 
LNMVE  0.476*** 0.476*** 0.477***  0.476*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)  (0.009) 
MA  0.012 0.014 0.013  0.016 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)  (0.020) 
FINANCING  -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.073***  -0.071*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)  (0.019) 
MB   -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.123***  -0.122*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) 
LEVE  1.330*** 1.340*** 1.329***  1.340*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.062)  (0.062) 
ROA  -0.107* -0.104* -0.107  -0.103 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.092)  (0.092) 
INVREC  0.922*** 0.923*** 0.921***  0.920*** 
  (0.050) (0.051) (0.089)  (0.089) 
LOSS  0.228*** 0.233*** 0.228***  0.234*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.028)  (0.029) 
SPECIAL  0.238*** 0.243*** 0.238***  0.243*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.020)  (0.020) 
OWN  -0.110*** -0.159*** -0.087*  -0.139*** 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.045)  (0.049) 
DGIndex  0.104*** 0.045*** 0.104***  0.042** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)  (0.019) 
OWN*DGIndex  0.090* 0.152*** 0.067  0.147** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.062)  (0.064) 
Observations  10366 10366 10366  10366 
R-squared  0.639 0.637 0.639  0.637 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table  12  
Specialist auditor premiums: OWN=Family  
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA  
+ β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + β12SPECIALIST 
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
  GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variables Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept  10.616*** 10.472*** 10.744*** 10.854***  10.466*** 
 (0.264) (0.258) (0.348) (0.448)  (0.260) 
BIG 0.220*** 0.274*** 0.158*** 0.246***  0.201*** 
 (0.042) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)  (0.057) 
LNMVE 0.477*** 0.461*** 0.483*** 0.449***  0.490*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.011) 
MA 0.013 0.009 0.018 -0.003  0.041 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)  (0.028) 
FINANCING -0.073*** -0.100*** -0.050** -0.077***  -0.064** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.026) 
MB  -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.121***  -0.120*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) 
LEVE 1.340*** 1.214*** 1.413*** 1.287***  1.377*** 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.082) (0.078)  (0.084) 
ROA -0.117 -0.145 -0.085 -0.206*  -0.021 
 (0.092) (0.133) (0.118) (0.112)  (0.122) 
INVREC 0.936*** 0.952*** 0.922*** 0.937***  0.907*** 
 (0.089) (0.109) (0.116) (0.104)  (0.121) 
LOSS 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.212***  0.240*** 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)  (0.038) 
SPECIAL 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.239*** 0.241***  0.256*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024)  (0.029) 
OWN -0.078** -0.110** -0.009 -0.164***  0.003 
 (0.039) (0.048) (0.056) (0.054)  (0.050) 
SPECIALIST 0.063** 0.100*** 0.023 0.075**  0.040 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)  (0.030) 
Observations 10366 5183 5183 5183  5183 
R-squared 0.637 0.624 0.649 0.597  0.663 
T value for 
Coefficient 
difference  
 126.38 
 
56.49 
 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 13 
 
Other measures of concentrated holdings: OWN= CEO Holdings/Insider holdings/Founder 
holdings 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE +β7ROA  
+ β8INVREC + β9 LOSS + β10 SPECIAL + β11OWN 
 + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
    GIndexI    GIndexII   
Variable  Full  Poor CG Good CG   Poor CG  
Good 
CG 
CEO Holdings  -0.439  -0.345 -0.262  -0.470  -0.318 
  (-3.340)***  (-2.330)** (-0.980)  (-3.080)***  (-1.390) 
Insiders Holdings  -0.249** -0.233* -0.124 -0.338**  -0.141 
  (0.107)  (0.128) (0.159)  (0.142)  (0.143) 
Founder   -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.086 -0.098***  -0.085 
  (0.029)  (0.031) (0.058)  (0.030)  (0.059) 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c The coefficients of control variables are not shown. 
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Table 14 
 
Results of regressions with different measures of family ownership separated into good and poor corporate governance firms using disaggregated 
components of CG: OWN=Family 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA + β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
  %Outsiders Independence Index Meetings Index Size Index CEO Power 
Variable  Low   High  Low  High  Low   High  Small Big  Strong  Weak  
Intercept   10.782***  10.557*** 10.576*** 10.728*** 10.480***  10.812*** 10.505*** 11.010*** 10.790*** 10.215*** 
  (0.168)  (0.146) (0.173) (0.143) (0.163)  (0.338) (0.160) (0.155) (0.311) (0.224) 
BIG  0.256***  0.191*** 0.269*** 0.182*** 0.288***  0.183*** 0.143*** 0.309*** 0.255*** 0.217*** 
  (0.030)  (0.040) (0.031) (0.039) (0.032)  (0.057) (0.044) (0.029) (0.055) (0.054) 
LNMVE  0.441***  0.507*** 0.429*** 0.508*** 0.452***  0.494*** 0.505*** 0.404*** 0.481*** 0.479*** 
  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
MA  0.028  -0.002 0.042* -0.014 0.034  -0.021 0.022 0.019 -0.014 0.035 
  (0.024)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
FINANCING  -0.093***  -0.054** -0.083*** -0.072*** -0.083***  -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.068** 
  (0.023)  (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) 
MB   -0.119***  -0.123*** -0.113*** -0.129*** -0.111***  -0.126*** -0.131*** -0.104*** -0.117*** -0.129*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
LEVE  1.300***  1.314*** 1.250*** 1.365*** 1.207***  1.381*** 1.559*** 1.081*** 1.264*** 1.419*** 
  (0.049)  (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048)  (0.077) (0.049) (0.047) (0.076) (0.081) 
ROA  0.060  -0.328*** 0.026 -0.279*** -0.178**  -0.040 -0.336*** 0.089 -0.314*** 0.054 
  (0.077)  (0.082) (0.077) (0.081) (0.083)  (0.122) (0.085) (0.074) (0.110) (0.136) 
INVREC  0.873***  0.995*** 0.794*** 1.067*** 0.941***  0.976*** 1.040*** 0.820*** 1.095*** 0.766*** 
  (0.071)  (0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.068)  (0.118) (0.072) (0.070) (0.106) (0.116) 
LOSS  0.269***  0.192*** 0.257*** 0.199*** 0.205***  0.226*** 0.193*** 0.250*** 0.189*** 0.269*** 
  (0.030)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)  (0.038) (0.031) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039) 
SPECIAL  0.266***  0.211*** 0.273*** 0.199*** 0.247***  0.215*** 0.221*** 0.259*** 0.239*** 0.249*** 
  (0.021)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) 
OWN  -0.055*  -0.032 -0.070** 0.043 -0.061*  -0.065 -0.085** -0.051 -0.145*** -0.011 
  (0.029)  (0.058) (0.030) (0.048) (0.032)  (0.053) (0.037) (0.034) (0.054) (0.051) 
Obs.  5183  5183 5180 5186 5195  5171 5165 5201 5231 5135 
R-squared  0.586  0.674 0.564 0.686 0.614  0.653 0.670 0.506 0.661 0.616 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
   54
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 15 
Large and small family firm and audit fees: OWN=Family 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA + β8INVREC 
+β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
Variable  Full  Lowest quartile  Highest quartile 
Intercept  10.961***  12.676***  10.583*** 
  (0.306)  (0.455)  (0.875) 
BIG  0.265**  0.306***  -0.196 
  (0.104)  (0.077)  (0.312) 
LNMVE  0.483***  0.151***  0.550*** 
  (0.025)  (0.054)  (0.056) 
MA  0.065  0.019  0.052 
  (0.072)  (0.114)  (0.085) 
FINANCING  -0.053 -0.055  -0.153 
  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.105) 
MB  -0.106***  -0.042*  -0.111*** 
  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.028) 
LEVE  1.219***  0.438**  1.960*** 
  (0.193)  (0.189)  (0.299) 
ROA  -0.293  -0.046  -1.502*** 
  (0.328)  (0.238)  (0.467) 
INVREC  1.221***  1.291***  1.880*** 
  (0.261)  (0.241)  (0.469) 
LOSS  0.234**  0.165  -0.085 
  (0.097)  (0.104)  (0.114) 
SPECIAL  0.121  0.152**  0.125 
  (0.078)  (0.074)  (0.115) 
OWN  -0.125*  -0.179***  -0.123 
  (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.093) 
Observations  748  374  374 
R-squared  0.700  0.323  0.608 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 16 
Family ownership and specialist auditor choice in the small firms:  OWN = Family  
 
SPECIALIST = β0 + β1LNMVE + β2LEVE + β3ROA + β4OWN  
                             + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
   GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variables Full   Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
Intercept -1.577***  -2.252*** -1.009*** -2.002***  -1.209*** 
 (0.229)  (0.341) (0.312) (0.336)  (0.315) 
LNMVE 0.187***  0.307*** 0.083 0.242***  0.143*** 
 (0.037)  (0.056) (0.051) (0.055)  (0.052) 
LEVE 0.901***  0.918*** 0.885*** 1.115***  0.668*** 
 (0.134)  (0.191) (0.190) (0.188)  (0.193) 
ROA 0.126  -0.173 0.369 0.167  0.043 
 (0.172)  (0.257) (0.235) (0.254)  (0.238) 
OWN 0.265**  0.040 0.610*** 0.073  0.420*** 
 (0.111)  (0.149) (0.174) (0.164)  (0.154) 
Observations 4504  2252 2252 2252  2252 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed Z significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 17 
Joint effect of family ownership and good corporate governance on audit fees in the small 
firms  
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA      
                    + β8INVREC + β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + β12DGIndex  
                    + β13OWN*DGIndex + Industry effects + Year effects + ε 
 
Variable 
 OWN = Family 
DGIndex = DGIndexI 
 OWN = Family  
DGIndex = DGIndexII 
Intercept   11.257***  11.309*** 
  (0.219)  (0.219) 
BIG  0.392***  0.397*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027) 
LNMVE  0.293***  0.292*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) 
MA  0.013  0.012 
  (0.028)  (0.028) 
FINANCING  -0.055**  -0.057** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) 
MB   -0.101***  -0.100*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
LEVE  1.063***  1.066*** 
  (0.047)  (0.048) 
ROA  0.300***  0.296*** 
  (0.066)  (0.066) 
INVREC  0.666***  0.667*** 
  (0.071)  (0.071) 
LOSS  0.266***  0.270*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027) 
SPECIAL  0.254***  0.259*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) 
OWN  -0.131***  -0.210*** 
  (0.048)  (0.052) 
DGIndex  0.085***  -0.001 
  (0.021)  (0.021) 
OWN*DGIndex  0.140*  0.244*** 
  (0.071)  (0.071) 
Observations  4504  4504 
R-squared  0.407  0.405 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 18 
 
 Entrenchment test: Effect of concentrated family ownership in the sub-sample where CEO 
ownership is in the highest quartile: OWN=Family 
 
LNFEE = β0 + β1BIG + β2LNMVE + β3MA + β4FINANCING + β5MB + β6LEVE + β7ROA + β8INVREC     
+ β9LOSS + β10SPECIAL + β11OWN + Industry effects + Year effects + ε  
 
Variable  OWN=Family 
Intercept   10.680*** 
  (0.258) 
BIG  0.307*** 
  (0.061) 
LNMVE  0.431*** 
  (0.019) 
MA  0.065* 
  (0.037) 
FINANCING  -0.090** 
  (0.037) 
MB   -0.112*** 
  (0.010) 
LEVE  1.178*** 
  (0.101) 
ROA  -0.053 
  (0.141) 
INVREC  0.692*** 
  (0.157) 
LOSS  0.235*** 
  (0.050) 
SPECIAL  0.267*** 
  (0.035) 
OWN  -0.044 
  (0.059) 
Observations  2591 
R-squared  0.531 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed T significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
c Industry and year dummies included in the regression but not shown in the Table. 
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Table 19 
 
Ordered logistic regression of S&P Long-Term Credit Rating on Family ownership: 
OWN=Family 
Rating = β0 + β1 SIZE + β2 ROA + β3 DEBT + β4 INTCOV+ β5 BETA+ β6 BM  
+ β7 OWN + ε  
    GIndexI  GIndexII   
Variable  Full  Poor CG Good CG Poor CG  Good CG 
SIZE  -0.868*** -0.937*** -0.814*** -0.895***  -0.819*** 
  (0.024) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036)  (0.034) 
ROA  -6.109*** -5.085*** -7.169*** -6.093***  -5.978*** 
  (0.368) (0.517) (0.530) (0.530)  (0.514) 
DEBT  3.710*** 4.016*** 3.551*** 3.799***  3.587***
  (0.162) (0.249) (0.216) (0.227)  (0.233) 
INTCOV  -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.000  -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
BETA  1.416*** 1.442*** 1.385*** 1.342***  1.510*** 
  (0.048) (0.070) (0.067) (0.066)  (0.071) 
BM  0.714*** 1.034*** 0.458*** 0.873***  0.575*** 
  (0.064) (0.101) (0.086) (0.094)  (0.089) 
OWN  -0.304*** -0.191 -0.426*** -0.082  -0.459*** 
  (0.106) (0.140) (0.164) (0.152)  (0.147) 
Observations  4667 2333 2334 2334  2333 
a *,**,*** Indicates two-tailed Z significance at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively; 
b Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Rating= S&P Issuer Long-Term Credit Rating, coded 1 for AAA rating, and 20 for D rating. 
SIZE= log of total assets. 
ROA= net income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item IB) divided by total assets; 
DEBT= total interest bearing debt (Compustat #9 and #34) to total assets. 
INTCOV= Operating income to interest expense. 
BETA= the 5-year rolling pre-estimated beta obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations 
using the past 5 years of data with at least 18 monthly returns. 
BM= Book value of equity (Compustat #60) divided by market value of equity at fiscal year-end 
(Compustat #199 ×#25). 
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